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Private Finance, Social Responsibility, and Transitional Justice:
The Case for South African Reconciliation and Development Bonds
by Daniel D. Bradlow*

T

he Reconciliation And Development Bond Project
(Project) was originally conceived as an attempt to
involve the South African expatriate community in the
process of national reconciliation that began with the end of
apartheid. It has since evolved into a broader effort to promote
development and reconciliation by using a creative financing
mechanism to raise funding, from both inside and outside the
country, for small revenue generating projects that provide jobs,
services, and opportunities for poor and historically disadvantaged South Africans.
The paper is divided into three sections. The first section
describes the genesis of the Project. The second discusses the
design of the Retail Reconciliation and Development Bonds
(R&D Bonds). The final section highlights some issues relating to development and transitional justice that arise from the
project.

Genesis of the Project
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC) is an historic commission that documented the tragic history of apartheid and promoted accountability for its perpetrators. Unfortunately, the TRC’s attempt at redressing the injuries
caused by apartheid was less comprehensive: it was limited to
an acknowledgment of the wrongs that apartheid had produced
and to compensating those people specifically identified in
its report as victims of state violence.1 Thus, the reconciliation work of the TRC was ultimately focused on repairing the
relationship between the South African state and black South
African citizens.
The TRC did not directly seek to promote reconciliation
between ordinary black and white South African citizens. It did
not establish any mechanism through which individual white
South Africans could acknowledge that they had been beneficiaries of the apartheid system and, therefore, make a gesture of
reconciliation. It also did not address the issue of how the South
African Diaspora could contribute to reconciliation and development in country.
In principle, there are many forms that this gesture could
take. Nevertheless, the history of one of the most successful
examples — the reconciliation between Germany and Jews following the end of World War II — demonstrates that one key
component of effective reconciliation is money. This is because
money helps those who suffered under the old order establish
a life that offers them, and their children, better opportunities
and more dignity than they had previously.2 Money also enables
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victims to pay the psychic price involved in moving beyond
their pain and anger and reconciling with those who previously
oppressed or harmed them.
The Project began as an attempt to address this unresolved
issue of reconciliation between different groups of citizens. It
was premised on the idea that reconciliation requires those who
benefited from apartheid to make a meaningful gesture towards
those who suffered under that system. Originally, the goal was
to design an appropriate vehicle through which private citizens
could make a meaningful contribution to the process of South
African reconciliation. Given the poverty of many black South
Africans and their limited access to jobs, services, and opportunities, the Project planned to achieve this goal by structuring a

“If charities cannot
succeed in funding
reconciliation, the
alternative is to appeal to
people’s self interest and
offer them an opportunity
to invest in reconciliation
and development.”
mechanism through which interested white South Africans, both
resident in the country and expatriates, could finance projects
that would help poor black South Africans overcome these challenges.
In order for a mechanism to contribute effectively to South
African reconciliation and development, it must satisfy three
reconciliation-financing criteria. First, it must raise enough
money to make a meaningful difference to the situation of poor
black South Africans. Second, there must be a sufficiently large
number of contributors to the mechanism to demonstrate a serious community-wide interest in reconciliation. Third, it must
use the money effectively enough to give all its stakeholders
confidence that the mechanism can make a noticeable impact on
solving the problems caused by apartheid.
1
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The most obvious vehicle for raising money for this purpose
is a charitable entity to which individuals that wish to make
gestures of reconciliation can donate to projects that create jobs,
services, and opportunities for those who, historically, were
denied access to them. In fact, such an entity was created. It
failed because only a relatively small number of people contributed to it.3 This is not to say that there are not enough white
South Africans of goodwill who are willing to work for the
reconciliation and development of the country. To the contrary,
most South Africans, including most white South Africans,
do make charitable contributions.4 This suggests that there are
other reasons that charitable entities fail to attract donations to
promote reconciliation. One important contributing factor is that
many South Africans are skeptical about the ability of the existing charitable organizations to effectively address the problems
of poverty. In other words, charitable giving to promote reconciliation is unable to satisfy the third reconciliation-financing
criterion.

There are two ways in which such investment vehicles may
operate — either through equity investments or debt financing.
The first is to establish an investment fund that makes equity
investments in qualifying projects. The attraction of equity for
development financing is that investors do not earn a return
on their investment until the projects generate profit. Equity
investments, however, are problematic vehicles for promoting
reconciliation. They can be perceived as a way for white South
Africans to both profit from the hard work of those black South
Africans who suffered under apartheid and to control (through
the voting rights associated with equity) the efforts of those they
previously oppressed.
The second option is to use debt to finance the investments.
This has a number of attractive advantages related to development and reconciliation. First, debt establishes a fixed term
contractual relationship between the investor and the recipient
of the funds. Once debtors have fully performed the agreed upon
contractual obligations, they are both independent of the creditor
and in a materially better condition than before the debt transaction. Second, the debtor, through reliable servicing of the debt,
can establish a credit history which should enhance its access to
future financing. Third, if the debt arrangement is structured so
that the borrower receives the funding on better terms than are
available from any other available funding source, the transaction can facilitate better relations between debtor and creditor,
thereby promoting reconciliation. The extent to which debt
financing promotes development and reconciliation depends
largely on this last point because if the borrower perceives the
terms of the debt to be too harsh, the debt transaction can undermine, rather than promote, reconciliation.
In order for debt financing to satisfy the three reconciliationfinancing criteria, the funds should be raised through an instrument that both appeals to as broad a group of individuals as
possible and raises a substantial amount of money for qualifying development projects. The only instrument that meets these
requirements is a retail bond issued on the South African domestic market. In addition to appealing to South African residents,
the instrument will also appeal to expatriates who have an interest in promoting reconciliation and development in the country.
Given the realities of distributing and servicing retail bonds,
any attempt to use them for reconciliation and development purposes must satisfy a fourth reconciliation-financing criterion —
it must be attractive to financial institutions. Their participation
will help convince potential investors that this is a legitimate
financial transaction in which they can earn both a reasonable
financial return and produce noticeable social benefits for South
Africa and its poor. Financial institutions can also provide the
distribution network through which the bonds are sold.
The Project has therefore become an effort to create and
issue a bond that is capable of meeting all four reconciliationfinancing criteria. Its proposed structure, which was developed
after extensive consultation with all stakeholders and a range of
technical experts, is described in the next section.

“The Project offers an
opportunity to experiment
with measuring the social
returns generated by small
scale revenue generating
development projects.”
If charities cannot succeed in funding reconciliation, the
alternative is to appeal to people’s self interest and offer them
an opportunity to invest in reconciliation and development. This
method of financing allows interested parties the opportunity to
earn a real financial and social return on their investment while
funding small scale revenue generating development projects,
such as small and micro-enterprises or low income housing.
These projects normally have difficulty getting financial support because they are both “too rich” and “too poor.” They are
“too rich” for grant funding because they generate revenues that
can be used to service a certain level of debt and they are “too
poor” for commercial funding either because of the size of the
project or because its rate of return is too low to be attractive to
a commercial lender.
These investments satisfy the three reconciliation-financing
criteria identified above. Because they will yield a real marketbased financial return, they have the potential to attract sufficient numbers of interested investors to both demonstrate
an interest in promoting reconciliation and to fund enough
development projects to have a meaningful impact on poverty,
inequality, and unemployment in South Africa. Furthermore, if
the investments meet certain financial and social standards, they
can demonstrate that they are, in fact, contributing to the building of a better future for all South Africans.

The Structure of the Project
The Project is currently designed to raise R1 billion5 to fund
a range of development projects through two instruments — a
Subordinated Instrument (SI) and a retail R&D Bond. The two
instruments will each seek to raise R500 million for a term of
ten years. Both the SI and the R&D Bond will be issued by the
8
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Project Issuer (PI), a private non-profit, tax exempt company
created for this purpose. The PI’s Board of Directors, which will
include representatives of the financial institutions that invest in
the Project, will represent all Project stakeholders, and will have
a small staff whose job will be to manage its relations with the
other actors in the project.

The Subordinated Instrument (Si)
The SI will be sold to financial institutions, corporations,
and foundations. The funds it raises will be managed by experienced fund managers who are contractually obliged to invest
the proceeds in commercial projects that satisfy a set of agreed
prudential, financial, social, and environmental criteria. The
resulting income will be used to pay all operating costs for the
PI and to help pay the interest on the R&D Bonds in the early
years of the Project.
The SI will offer investors the following benefits:
1. Upon maturity, purchasers will receive a lump sum payment
equal to their original investment, plus a stipulated pro rata
share of the surplus remaining after all other Project related
obligations have been satisfied.
2. The Project’s investments will entitle qualifying SI holders
to score points towards their sectoral charter obligations.6
3. A tax benefit that is available to investors under the current
law.7
4. Banks that are holders of the SI will benefit from the banking
business generated by the Bond Project.
5. The project structure will enable interested SI holders to
learn about the risks and rewards of doing business with the
small scale project funded by the retail R&D Bonds.
6. The holders will profit from the goodwill created by their
participation in the Project.
7. All SI investors will receive an annual report describing the
projects being funded by the Project and detailing the social
benefits that have accrued from these projects.

The Retail R&D Bonds
The R&D Bonds will be a non-tradable debenture with a
periodic interest payment. Bonds will be sold for R500 per
bond and each bond will carry an interest rate equal to the rate
offered by the Government of South Africa on its five-year
Government Retail Bond, which at the time of writing (October
2007) is 10.0 percent.8 The principal will be repaid at the end of
the ten-year term of the R&D Bond. It is expected that the bond
will be bought by those South Africans with some disposable
income, expatriate South Africans, and friends of South Africa.
All bondholders will receive the same annual report as the one
given to SI investors.
All proceeds raised through the R&D Bond will be invested
in activities that meet the goals of the Project. The PI will be
responsible for arranging for the investment of these funds. The
PI itself will not directly invest the funds raised by the R&D
Bond, instead it will enter into contractual arrangements with
four to six “Implementing Agencies” (IAs) that that are in the
business of investing in the types of activities that the Project is
designed to support. These IAs will be responsible for identifying the projects to which the funds will be loaned, and for working with their sponsors to make sure they succeed and are able

to repay their debts to the IAs. The use of 4-6 IAs will allow for
some variety in the skills, experience and scope of operations of
the IAs, and for some diversification of risk.9
The contract between the IAs and the PI will include three
sets of provisions to ensure that the Bond proceeds are only
used to fund qualifying projects. First, the funds can only be
used to finance projects that meet a set of agreed criteria. These
criteria will both establish a principled basis for holding the IAs
accountable for their use of the money and a predictable basis
on which the PI can reject non-conforming project proposals.
Second, the contract will oblige the IA to invest a stipulated
amount of money over a number of years; however, the IA
cannot access the funds until it provides the PI with a project
proposal that complies with the terms of the contract. Once the
PI approves the project, the fund manager will transfer the necessary funds to a dedicated bank account controlled by the IAs
and the PI. The funds will only be disbursed from this account
for approved project related expenditures. Third, the contract
will make clear that the IA is responsible for repaying, together
with the stipulated interest rate, the funds advanced by the PI.

“Financial institutions,
particularly those in poor
countries, need to rethink
their approach to business
and social responsibility.”
Issues Arising from the Project
The Project raises a number of interesting issues that merit
further investigation. First, the Project highlights the fact that
most transitional justice efforts involving prosecutions and truth
commissions focus on the relationship between the state and
those who suffered under the old order. They only indirectly
address the relations between the different social groupings that
were involved in the conflict. It is not possible for a post-conflict
society to achieve sustainable peace if these social groupings do
not directly reconcile with each other. Consequently, there is a
need to supplement the state’s transitional justice efforts with
mechanisms that promote reconciliation between these non-state
social groupings. The Project demonstrates that it is possible to
use innovative applications of traditional financial instruments
to promote reconciliation between the different groups within
a post-conflict society. This is particularly important given that
financial compensation has proven to be one of the most effective ways to promote reconciliation.
Second, the Project demonstrates that it is possible to involve
the expatriate elements of the different social groupings in these
reconciliation efforts. Consequently, the bonds can become a
useful way for a country to simultaneously raise funds from its
local middle and upper classes and its diaspora.10
3
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useful data on how they can adapt their grant making expertise
to investing in these categories of development work.
Fifth, the Project offers an opportunity to experiment with
measuring the social returns generated by small-scale revenuegenerating development projects. Currently, there are not well
established methodologies for measuring such returns. The
Project proposes to provide each investor in the project with
a detailed annual report on the investments being made by the
IAs. These reports will inform investors about the social benefits
that their investments are producing and hold the IAs and PI
accountable for their use of the Bond proceeds. The empirical
data that this generates can be used by interested parties to test
methodologies for measuring social returns on investments.
Such methodologies can help similar projects demonstrate that
they are meeting the third reconciliation-financing criterion,
namely that they are having a meaningful impact on poverty
alleviation and development.

Third, the Project raises an interesting question about the
nature of the investment approaches used by most financial
institutions. The initiatives that the Project aims to support have
difficulty raising funds because they do not meet either of the
two usual sets of criteria that financial institutions use in making their lending decisions — those used in commercial lending
and those used in allocating their corporate social responsibility
funds. As explained above, the projects to be funded by the
R&D Bonds do not meet the criteria financial institutions use
in extending credit on commercial terms. In addition, because
they generate a stream of income, these projects are not viewed
as attractive candidates for support from the donations that
financial institutions make as part of their social responsibility.
This suggests that financial institutions, particularly those in
poor countries, need to rethink their approach to business and
social responsibility. Instead of dividing all their investment
activities into either one of these two categories, businesses
should consider them as the two end-points of a spectrum of
activities that range from profit maximizing activities at the one
end to goodwill generating gifts at the other. The Project offers
these institutions an opportunity to experiment and to learn more
about how to identify other points along this spectrum.
Fourth, the Project offers foundations and other grant makers
the opportunity to learn about how they can support sub-commercial revenue generating projects that produce jobs, services
and opportunities for poor people. It should provide them with

Conclusion
The Project was originally conceived as a vehicle for
promoting reconciliation, but it has evolved into an innovative
reconciliation and development financing project. The Project,
if successfully implemented, has the potential to be scaled up
and to be replicated in a number of different countries and
regions.
HRB
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